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Summary 
 
The productivity differences have been proposed as a main factor of large differences in GDP 
per capita. Generally speaking, bad aggregate economic performance has been attributed 
broadly to "government regulations". In particular, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and 
Klenow (2009) and Alfaro et al. (2008) suggested that resource misallocation affected by 
shocks is highly related with the aggregate total factor productivity. 
Thus in this paper, we have studied on misallocation in Norway and Chile. Norway has strong 
economic condition which is stable. In the contrast, Chilean economy was heavily regulated, 
suffered a financial crisis in the beginning of 1980s and implemented in labor and capital 
market reforms that led to a strong recovery from mid 1980s.  
The aim of this paper is to perform analysis on to what extent resources are distorted and how 
policies relate to aggregate efficiency in Chile and Norway. Using Hsieh and Klenow (2009)'s 
framework, we build the model that monopolistic competitive firms face distortions on output 
and capital. Distortions differentiate marginal revenue product across firms and therefore 
decrease aggregate TFP. 
The data used are collected from Instituto National de Estadistica (INE) and World Bank's 
report for Chile (1980-1996), and from Statistics Norway (1996-2006). 
To study the main impact of resource misallocation, we compare detrended aggregate TFP 
between Chile and Norway and find that the detrended TFP in Norway is fairly stable. We 
compute TFP relative to efficient TFP by assuming zero distortion and constant wage rate 
across firms. The high gain from removing distortions in Chile indicates that labor and capital 
inputs are more distorted in Chile than in Norway. Additionally, the moment of firm size 
distribution shows that both distorted and efficient size distribution are more dispersed in 
Chile. 
After that we decompose efficiency gain in two ways. First the variance decomposition 
presents that in Norway the components of efficiency gain are fairly stable. In contrast, the 
variance of output distortion in Chile is the main component explaining the decreasing 
efficiency gain. Second, we decompose variances with different productivity quintiles. The 
 
 
quintile analysis suggests that in Chile the between-group component of output wedges at 
both end of the distribution mainly explains the change in its variance. Furthermore, the 
negative correlation between productivity and output wedges concludes that in Chile, the less 
distortion faced by low productive firms is a stronger driving force to the increasing TFP in 
Chile since 1986. A possible explanation could be that Chilean reform policies since 1986 
were more effective on decreasing distortions from the low productive firms, which would 
drove falling TFP gain. 
     
The empirical work in this paper is performed using Stata. 
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1 Introduction
The productivity di¤erences have been proposed as a main factor of large di¤erences
in GDP per capita (Caselli, 2005; Bergoeing et. al, 2007; Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare,
1997). In particular, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Alfaro
et al. (2008) show that resource misallocation a¤ected by the idiosyncratic shocks is highly
related with aggregate total factor productivity (TFP).
Thus it is important to understand the impact of exogenous shocks, like government
policies, on aggregate e¢ ciency. Norway has a strong economy with equitable distribu-
tion of wealth, high taxes and extensive social welfare system. In the contrast, Chilean
economy was heavily regulated, su¤ered a nancial crisis in the beginning of 1980s and
implemented in labor and capital market reforms that led to a strong recovery from mid
1980s.
The aim of this paper is to study how resource misallocation relates to aggregate
TFP in the manufacturing sector in Norway and Chile. Using Hsieh and Klenow (2009)s
framework, we build the model that monopolistic competitive rms face distortions on
output and capital. Distortions di¤erentiate marginal revenue product across rms and,
therefore, decrease aggregate TFP.
The rm-level data are collected from Instituto National de Estadistica (INE) and
World Banks report for Chile (1980-1996) and from Statistics Norway (1996-2006) for
Norway. To describe the extent of resource misallocation, we compare the moments
of rm size distribution and rm productivity distribution between Chile and Norway,
and nd that the resource allocation in Chile manufacturing is more distorted than in
Norway. After that, we decompose the TFP gain from removing distortions in two ways:
variance decomposition and quintile analysis. We show that in Chile the variance of
output distortion is the main component explaining the decreasing TFP gain, while the
between-quintile component of output wedges explain most of the variance change. In
contrast, Norway shows stable trend with a small variation.
There are growing literatures studying resource misallocation in manufacturing sector.
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) analyze the distortion and aggregate productivity in pro-
duction units. They show that policies generate distortions which create di¤erent price
faced by producer, and thus lead to changes in TFP and aggregate capital accumulation.
Neumeyer and Sandleris (2009) test the misallocation in Argentine manufacturing from
1997 to 2002 when the rms within narrowly dened industries face wide dispersion of
wedges. They nd that the equalizing marginal revenue products results in 60%-80% of
e¢ ciency gain. They also observe a positive correlation between capital distortion and
productivity of rm. The decomposition of the growth of TFP gives that the within e¤ect
is the main component explaining the change in TFP growth. In addition, Midrigan and
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Xu (2009) investigate Korean manufacturing data. They evaluate the e¤ects of distorted
investment which accounts for 2.5% loss of capital misallocation in nancial friction. The
low gain of removing distortion may be caused by decreasing return to scale in production
function (Moll, 2009)
Moreover, Jones (2009) also discusses the aggregate TFP in the aggregate economy. He
demonstrates that the complementary e¤ect across industries can amplify industry-level
distortions to have large TFP loss and ine¢ cient resource allocation.
This paper also contributes to the literature related to the asset market. Banerjee
and Moll (2009) study the persistence of misallocation in underdevelopment countries by
focusing on the asset market. They build the model of agents for prot maximization with
credit constrains. They nd that the steady state and stabilized interest rate decrease
the misallocation. The shock on the assets including distortion on assets and ability
creates loss on capital stock, and makes agents be under-invested with increasing marginal
product. Then they conclude that capital wedges are the main reasons of persistence.
Additionally, our work relates to the misallocation in nancial frictions. Moll (2009)
extends his research to the topic of self-nancing and capital misallocation in nancial
friction. He builds the model with heterogeneous rms subject to borrowing constraints
and productivity shocks. The result shows that the TFP gain from removing distortions
has signicant relationship with productivity shocks when nancial frictions have impacts
on aggregate productivity. He also states that the self-nancing can lose the capital mis-
allocation with stable productivity shock. Chen and Song (2009) also build the model for
nancial frictions. They introduce shock on credit conditions and construct the model
without labor input. They introduce asymmetric nancing constraint, and test implica-
tions by using data for US. Intuitively, they nd the variances of nancial friction which
in turn is the source of transmission mechanism for shocks. It causes changes in aggregate
TFP over business cycles.
Hermes and Lensink (1996) study the nancial reforms in 1980s in Chile. They work
on the rms investment and nance by using the balance sheet. They show that reforms
aiming to reduce intra-conglomerate lending reduce the imperfection in capital market.
Finally, we organize the paper as follow. In Section 2, we introduce the two-rm model
with the assumption that only one rm is distorted and then discuss the simple intuitions
on aggregate TFP. Section 3 derives the misallocation and performance measures in gen-
eral case with multiple rms. Section 4 gives the quantitative analysis that we decompose
changes in e¢ cient gain in Chile and Norway to identify the most inuential component.
At last, we give the conclusion.
2
2 Two-Firms Case
In this section, a model of two rms is created. It is supposed that rm 1 faces an output
distortion. The analysis in the following gives the basic model setup. The extended
intuition shows that distortion in rm 1 leads to unequalized marginal revenue product
and less size dispersion for rms. We also explain the extent to which capital and labor
are misallocated in the economy and how a aggregate TFP loss occur.
2.1 The Model Setup
In this section, we build up a model for rms in a monopolistic competition. The aim is
to solve for optimal price and marginal revenue product of labor and capital.
The optimization problems are constructed in nal industry and intermediate industry.
It is assumed that a nal good is produced by a representative rm. The nal good is
a CES aggregator using output produced by monopolistically competitive rms. Firms
produce intermediate goods in a monopolistically competitive market by using capital
and labor as production input.
Final good produced by a representative producer
Final good Y is a CES function which combines two kind of input Y1 and Y2 from rm
1 and 2 with decreasing return to scale. The elasticity of the function equals to ; where
 > 1.
Y =

Y
 1

1 + Y
 1

2
 
 1
The industry sells nal output Y to plants at numeraire price (P = 1) and buys interme-
diates Y1 and Y2 from rms at price P1 and P2 in a perfectly competitive market. The
problem of the industry is
max
Y1;Y2
 = Y   (P1Y1 + P2Y2)
By solving the optimization problem of the rm, the input demand function of interme-
diate good i with price Pi is
Yi =
1
P i
Y
Intermediate good
The production function of each individual rm, Yi, is Cobb-Douglas with capital and
labor inputs.
Yi = AiK

i L
1 
i (1)
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where Ai is rms productivity related to rm-level e¢ ciency of production.  is the share
of capital input which is same across rms.
With monopolistic competition in the intermediate good market, rms are maximizing
prot by hiring labor and capital at xed factor prices. Firm 1 is supposed to face
distorting income tax which accounts for 100% of rm 1s revenue, and 0 <  < 1. This
policy does not a¤ect rm 2. Therefore, these two rms will solve the following problems.
max
P1;L1;K1
1 = (1  )P1A1K1 L1 1   wL1  RK1
s:t: : Y1 =
1
P 1
Y
max
P2;L2;K2
2 = P2A2K

2 L
1 
2   wL2  RK2
s:t: : Y1 =
1
P 1
Y
The rst order condition gives the optimal price for each rm1.
P1 =

   1

R


w
1  
1 
1
A1(1  )| {z }
MC1
(2)
P2 =

   1

R


w
1  
1 
1
A2| {z }
MC2
(3)
Notice that, with no distortion,  = 0; input prices are equalized across rms. Notice
that the rms optimal price is decreasing with rm productivity Ai. In other words, a
more productive rm is more competitive and charges lower price. This is because in
rm 1 output distortion rises marginal cost, and this leads to higher optimal price. Thus
P1 > P
e
1 ; P2 = P
e
2 , where P
e
i is the e¢ cient price with  = 0 charge by the rms 1 and 2.
The rst order condition shows that marginal revenue of products are equalized across
rms in the undistorted case with MRPKei = MRPKe and MRPL
e
i = MRPL
e for
1In Appendix I, we show the deriviation process in details.
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i = 1:2. In the distorted case, we get
MRPK1 , 
   1

P1Y1
K1
=
R
1   > MRPK
e
1
MRPK2 , 
   1

P2Y2
K2
= R =MRPKe2
MRPL1 , (1  )    1

P1Y1
L1
=
w
1   > MRPL
e
1
MRPL2 , (1  )    1

P2Y2
L2
= w =MRPLe2
where both MRPK and MRPL in rm 1 increase with positive output distortion. The
marginal revenue product in rm 1 is always higher than e¢ cient value. Take marginal
revenue product of capital as an example. Figure 1 plots both distorted and e¢ cient
MRPK in rm 1. The interest rate is set that R = 0:1. Figure 1 shows that when
0 <  < 1, the distorted MRPK curve (solid line) lies above its e¢ cient curve(grey dash
line). The curvature ofMRPK1 depends on the parameter R: the lower interest rate, the
more curvature of the distorted MRPK1. In Figure 1, the black dash line with R = 0:01
is more curvature than the solid line with R = 0:1:
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
tau
MRPK1
efficient MRPK1=R=MRPK2
distorted MRPK1
Figure 1: MRPK1: distorted and e¢ cient case
2.2 Intuition
In this section, we show that distortion causes resource misallocation and decreases size
dispersion.
Resource allocation
5
The social planner always allocate resources to maximize social welfare. In our rst
best case, resources are appropriate allocated whenMRPKe1 =MRPK
e
2 =MRPK
e and
MRPLe1 = MRPL
e
2 = MRPL
e. When  > 0, the output distortion creates wedges in
marginal revenue products in rm 1. Thus misallocation of resource leads to suboptimal
undesirable resource allocation. In Figure 2, we plot marginal product of capital and
labor allocation. When interest rate is distorted with  > 0 in rm 1, the price per unit
of capital increases. Since rm 1 has to pay higher price for capital input and faces an
increasing marginal product, the capital demand in rm 1 falls. Thus rm 1 will encounter
loss on prot because of capital misallocation.
Taxed interest rate
Untaxed interest rate
R/(1-τ)
R
In
te
re
st
ra
te
MRPK 1
Distorted K1 Undistorted K1
Capital Misallocation
Profit Loss
R
In
te
re
st
ra
te
MRPK 2
Undistorted K2K1 K2
Figure 2: MRPK and Capital Demand
The resource allocation can be derived from optimal problem that L1
L2
=

A1
A2
 1
(1 
) <
Le1
Le2
and K1
K2
=

A1
A2
 1
(1   ) < Ke1
Ke2
. This is consistent with the analysis above.
Thus we can conclude that
L1 < L
e
1 L2 = L
e
2
K1 < K
e
1 K2 = K
e
2
Size dispersion
When  > 0; the distortion a¤ects revenue size in rm 1.
If rmsproductivity are exogenous and are independent from distortion, the produc-
tion of rm 1 will be lower than e¢ cient output as capital is misallocated. In addition,
6
the optimization gives Y1
Y2
=

A1
A2

(1  ) < Y e1
Y e2
. Thus (1) indicates
Y1 < Y
e
1
Y2 = Y
e
2
As the price ratio equals to P1
P2
= A2
A1(1 ) dividing (2) by (3), the revenue ratio between
rms is computed as
P1Y1
P2Y2
=

A1
A2
 1
(1  ) 1 <

A1
A2
 1
=
P e1Y
e
1
P e2Y
e
2
(4)
Equation (4) shows that the revenue ratio decreases with an increase output distortion.
As rm 2 sustains e¢ cient price and output, we nd that the revenue in rm 1 fall from
its e¢ cient level, which gives
P1Y1 < P
e
1Y
e
1 (5)
P2Y2 = P
e
2Y
e
2 (6)
We subtract (5) by (6) to get P1Y1   P2Y2 < P e1Y e1   P e2Y e2 . This shows that higher
distortion in rm 1 also leads to less size di¤erence between rms. This situation is
intensied when there is a lower elasticity  ( > 1) and 0 <  < 1 in (4).Thus we can
conclude that when output distortion works on the rm, and the industry has higher
elasticity of substitution of inputs, the size dispersion is less dispersed that the e¢ cient
level.
Suppose rm 1 is more productive than rm, when  = 0, rm 1 demands more capital
and labor. Because rm 1 sets a lower price, output in rm 1 is larger, and rm 1 will
acquire more revenue from production. Thus the variance of size in e¢ cient case exceeds
the level in distorted situation.
TFPR
Here TFPQ is dened as the rm productivity and TFPR as the revenue-based pro-
ductivity (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). TFPR is also called real multi-factor productivity
in Bartelsman et. al (2008)s paper.
TFPQi , Ai
TFPRi , PiAi
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TFPR can be written as an weighted average of MRPK and MRPL.
TFPRi , PiAi / (MRPKi) (MRPLi)1 
There are two ways to explain the change of TFPR for rm 1. First, the distortion
increases marginal revenue products in rm 1, and thus TFPR1 rises. Second, a positive
 increases the optimal price. Thus distorted TFPR1 is higher, and TFPR2 remains at
its e¢ cient level.
TFPR1 > TFPR
e
1
TFPR2 = TFPR
e
2
Recall that in the e¢ cient case, rms have equal TFPR and TFPRe1 = TFPR
e
2 =
TFPRe:
2.3 Aggregation and TFP
In this section, we discuss the problem of aggregating individual production input to
nd total labor and capital demand when  > 0. The aggregate output decreases with
distortion: The expression of aggregate TFP is computed which is decreasing with distor-
tion. Finally, it is argued that when more productive rms are distorted then the decrease
of TFP is larger
Aggregation
Partial equilibrium is assumed in the capital and labor market. The total capital and
labor demand equals to total supply. Thus L = L1 + L2 and K = K1 +K2. Since labor
and capital demands decrease in rm 1. The aggregate resources are
L < Le
K < Ke
As input demand decreases in rm 1, while it remains in the same level in rm 2. The
labor and capital demand ratios are L1
L1+L2
= 1
1+
L2
L1
and K1
K1+K2
= 1
1+
K2
K1
which are increasing
with L1
L2
and K1
K2
, thus we have
L1
L
<
Le1
Le
K1
K
<
Ke1
Ke
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Hence the distortion leads to contraction on total capital and labor demand.
Obviously, the total manufacturing output goes down with decreasing output in rm
1 since Y = Y1 + Y2: We have
Y < Y e
Aggregate TFP
By aggregating output, labor and capital (see Appendix I for details), we show that
the aggregate TFP calculated by growth-accounting method equals to the TFP formula
in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Thus we have
TFP , Y
KL1 
=
"
A1
TFPR
TFPR1
 1
+

A2
TFPR
TFPR2
 1# 1 1
(7)
where
TFPR =

A 11 (1  ) 1 + A 12
 1
 1 < TFPRe
Furthermore, from (7) we have TFP < TFP e as distortion decreases TFPR and increases
TFPR in rm 1.
Then (7) can be written as
TFP =

(A1(1  )) 1 + A 12
 
 1
A 11  (1  ) + A 12
(8)
By setting  = 0, the e¢ cient TFP is
TFP e =
 
A 11 + A
 1
2
 1
 1 (9)
where e¢ cient TFP is a CES aggregator of individual productivity in rm 1 and 2.
TFP and distortion
Now we discuss the relationship between aggregate TFP and distortion.
According to (8) and (9), we draw curves of TFP against distortion in Figure 3 by
assuming A1 = 1, A2 = 1,  = 3 and  = 13 . The Figure 3 shows that distorted TFP
always lies below e¢ cient TFP, and is decreasing with distortion. To illustrate this, we
take  = 0:5 for example in (8) and (9). Then the aggregate TFP in e¢ cient and distorted
level are computed respectively, and it gives TFP e=0:5  2:236 and TFP=0:5  2:124:
Obviously TFP=0:5 < TFP e=0:5. So the distorted TFP is lower than e¢ cient TFP when
 = 0:5. The result also gives that the whole industry will obtain 5:3% (= 2:236
2:124
  1)
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tau
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efficient TFP
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Figure 3: TFP and TFP e¢ cient
more of TFP if distortion decreases from 0.5 to 0 and capital and labor are reallocated to
e¢ cient level. The graph also presents that, TFP gain is increasing with positive  .
Now suppose that rm 1 is more productive than rm2, for example, A1 = 2 and
A2 = 1. Again we plot TFP curves with di¤erent productivity sets in Figure 4. When
rm 1 is a more productive rm being distorted, the aggregate TFP drops faster than
when rm 2 is more productive. In this case TFP=0:5  1:886. The e¢ ciency gain from
removing distortions is about 18:6% (= 2:236
1:886
  1) which is larger than 5:3% when A1 = 1,
A2 = 2. Thus an adjustment of distortion and resource misallocation in a more productive
rm 1 results signicant growth of aggregate TFP.
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Figure 4: TFP in di¤erent productivity parameters
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3 Many-Firms Case
In this section, we generalized the previous model to account for many intermediate
good. The nal good is produced by a representative rm who buy input from M rms.
Therefore, each monopolistic competitive rm faces output distortion Y i and capital
distortion Ki. Firm-specic wages are included rather than constant wage for all rms
in the last section.
In the following, the general solutions to optimization problems of the nal and inter-
mediate sector are presented when rm faces specic distortions. Then we show aggregate
labor and capital demand. Finally, the aggregate TFP is expressed as a function of dis-
tortions and rm productivity. The TFP gain is derived which relates to TFPR.
3.1 Firms Optimal Decisions
In this part, we describe the problem of the rm in the nal and intermediate sector which
is also discussed by Jones(2009). We derive labor and capital demand, optimal price,
TFPR, etc as functions of distortions. In addition, the size distribution is discussed. It
shows that the rms distorted size will be less spread out than the e¢ cient size.
Final sector
A single nal good is produced by a representative rm in perfectly competitive mar-
ket. The representative rm takes input price at Pi for each i intermediate good. The
nal output is a CES aggregator over M di¤erentiated products. The problem of this
rm is
max
Yi
PY  
X
PiYi
st :
Y =
 
MX
i=1
Y
 1

i
! 
 1
(10)
This gives demand of output as
Yi =
P i
P 
 Y
where P =

MP
k=1
P 1 k
 1
1 
is the price index, and we set P as the numeraire.
Intermediate sector
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In monopolistic competition, rm i hires labor at rm-specic wage wi and use capital
at a constant interest rate R: The problem of the intermediate producer i is
max
Li;Ki;Pi
i = (1  Y i)PiYi   wiLi  R(1 +  i)Ki
st :
Yi = AiK
a
i L
1 
i (11)
Yi =
P i
P 
 Y (12)
The rst order condition gives
Ki
Li
=

1   
wi
(1 + Ki)R
(13)
Pi =

   1

R


(
wi
1  )
1  (1 + Ki)

Ai (1  Y i) (14)
Equation (13) shows that the capital-labor ratio decreases with capital distortion. In
the e¢ cient case without output and capital distortions, the capital-labor ratio varies
across rms with rm-specic wage. In (14), distortions rise optimal price with increasing
marginal cost. In the undistorted case, a low-wage rm expanding production e¢ ciency
by increasing Ai decreases optimal price.
Resource allocation
To interpret labor and capital demand, we insert (13) into (11). Then we substitute
Yi and Pi by using (12) and (14). Finally, resource demands are solved from rst order
condition.
Li =

   1

 
R
( 1)1  
wi
(1 )+
A 1i (1  Y i)
(1 + Ki)( 1)
Y
Ki =

   1

 
R
( 1)+11  
wi
(1 )( 1)
A 1i (1  Y i)
(1 + Ki)
( 1)+1Y
The resource demand depends on both rm productivity and distortions. Non-zero distor-
tions cause resource misallocation and di¤erentiated marginal revenue of products. From
the rst order condition, marginal revenue of products are xed markups over revenue
productivity of capital and labor respectively.
MRPKi ,
@PiYi
@Ki
= 
   1

PiYi
Ki
= R
1 + Ki
1  Y i (15)
MRPLi ,
@PiYi
@Li
= (1  s)   1

PiYi
Li
=
wi
1  Y i (16)
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Equation (15) and (16) show that the gain from revenue earned by rm i from hiring an
additional input increases with distortions. When Ki > 0 and 0 < Lsi < 1, Distortions
lead to the results that labor and capital demands deviate from social planners e¢ cient
allocation.
Cost and prot share
Equations (15) and (16) show that the share of capital cost and the wage bill decline
with distortions asRKi
PiYi
=  1

1 Y i
1+Ki
and wiLi
PiYi
= (1  )  1

(1  Y i). In the e¢ cient
case, cost shares are xed when marginal revenue products are identical across rms.
Then we can write the before-distorted prot share as
before-distortedi
PiYi
= 1  wiLi
PiYi
  RKi
PiYi
= 1     1


(1  ) (1  Y i) + 1  Y i
1 + Ki

The prot share before distortion decreases with the level of distortion. While after being
distorted, the rate of elasticity  has negative impact on rms prot ratio. It means
that when the production of nal good is more elastic with inputs from rms, the after-
distorted prot share for all rms shrinks to a same level 1

, as
after-distortedi
(1  Y i)PiYi = 1 
1 + Ki
1  Y i
wiLi
PiYi
  1
1  Y i
RKi
PiYi
=
1

Revenue size dispersion
From the rst order condition, we get rm size as
PiYi =
A 1i (1   yi) 1
(1 + Ki)
( 1)
"

   1

R


wi
1  
1 # ( 1)
Y (17)
with input price 
 1
 
R

   wi
1 
1 
=
PM
i=1

Ai(1 Y i)
(1+Ki)w
1 
i
 1 1 1
w1 i .
Intuitively, with  > 1 in (17), rms size is increasing with productivity but decreasing
with distortions Y i and Ki. Now we suppose that TFPQ has positive correlation with
Y i or Ki. As rms productivity increases with revenue, a high level of e¢ cient revenue
of rms implies that rms are more e¢ cient, but face large positive output distortion or
high interest rate. This results declined revenue in highly productive rms by involving
less capital and labor inputs. Similarly, least productive rms produce more with low
distortion. Then revenues in least productive rms increase. Therefore, the revenue
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gap between e¢ cient and ine¢ cient rms decreases. This is to say, the distorted size
distribution has less dispersion than the e¢ cient distribution. A similar result is stated
by Bartelsman et. al (2008)
TFPR and TFPQ
Same as in the two-rm case, we dene TFPRi as the revenue-based productivity.
Notice that, it depends on distortions all well. Similarly TFPQi is dened as the physical
productivity.
TFPRi , PiAi =
PiYi
Ki L
1 
i
(18)
TFPQi , Ai =
Yi
Ki L
1 
i
After rearranging (15) and (16), we can rewrite TFPR in (18) as the weighted average of
marginal revenue products.
TFPRi =

   1

MRPKi


MRPLi
1  
1 
(19)
=

   1

R


wi
1  
1 
(1 + Ki)

1  Y i (20)
The e¢ cient TFPR without distortion changes across rm with rm-specic wage. This
is di¤erent from Hsieh and Klenow(2009)s model with constant wage across rms.
3.2 Aggregation and TFP
In this section, aggregate TFP is written as a function of distortions. When rms are
subject to distortions, TFP is a¤ected by TFPRi and TFPR. At the end, the TFP gain
from removing distortions is also discussed by comparing distorted TFP with e¢ cient
TFP.
Aggregate TFP
The growth accounting expresses aggregate TFP as
TFP ,

1
M
 1
 1 Y
KL1 
(21)
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Aggregate output Y in (21) is substituted by inserting (11) into (10). TFP becomes a
function of TFPQ and input shares.
TFP =
1
M
1
 1
24 MX
i=1
 
Ai

Ki
K

Li
L
1 ! 1 35

 1
(22)
Intuitively, from (22), an industry with rms facing ine¢ cient resource allocation will
experience a drop on aggregate TFP. At the same time, TFP increases with TFPQ of
each rm.
Now to express TFP in terms of rms productivity and distortions, the rst step is to
compute capital and labor ratio. Solving (15) and (16) for capital and labor allocation,
we have
Ki =

R
   1

1  Y i
1 + Ki
PiYi
Li =
1  s
wi
   1

(1  Y i)PiYi
We aggregate Li and Ki by summing up input demands across rms (L =
PM
i=1 Li and
K =
PM
i=1Ki). Firm input shares are
Ki
K
=
1 Y i
1+Ki
PiYi
MX
j=1
1 Y j
1+Kj
PjYj
(23)
Li
L
=
1 Y i
wi
PiYi
MX
j=1
1 Y j
wj
PjYj
(24)
Then (23) and (24) are plugged into (22) which delivers
TFP =
0BBBB@
MX
i=1
1 Y i
wi
PiYi
PY
MX
i=1
1 Y i
1+Ki
PiYi
PY
1CCCCA
 " MX
i=1

Ai
1 Y i
(1+Ki)
w1 i
PiYi
PY
 1

# 
 1
MX
i=1
1 Y i
wi
PiYi
PY

1
M
 1
 1
(25)
=

L
K

Y
L

1
M
 1
 1
Although rm-specic wages are used in the model, it is possible to reach a similar
conclusion as Neumeyer and Sandleris (2009)s. The rst term in equation (25) represents
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distortion to capital-labor ratio. The second term plays role on rms operation scale.
Now we substitute PiYi by using (17). The growth accounting TFP can be rewritten as
TFP ,

1
M
 1
 1 Y
KL1 s
=
 
1
M
 1
 1
PM
i=1

Ai(1 Y i)
(1+Ki)
w1 i
 1  1
"
MX
i=1
1 Y i
wi
h
Ai(1 Y i)
(1+Ki)w
1 
i
i 1#1 s " MX
i=1
1 Y i
1+Ki
h
Ai(1 Y i)
(1+Ki)w
1 
i
i 1# (26)
Appendix II shows that the aggregate TFP derived by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) equals
to (26). Thus it can be concluded that
TFP ,

1
M
 1
 1 Y
KL1 
=
"
1
M
MX
i=1

Ai  TFPR
TFPRi
 1# 1 1
(27)
Similar to (19), TFPR is dened as the geometric average of the MRPK and MRPL:
TFPR =

   1

MRPK


MRPL
1  
1 
=

   1
0BBBB@ R

MX
i=1
1 Y i
1+Ki
PiYi
PY
1CCCCA
0BBBB@ 1
(1  )
MX
i=1
1 Y i
wi
PiYi
PY
1CCCCA
1 
MRPL and MRPK are some "sort" of average of MRPs. Comparing with marginal
revenue product of rms, variables in MRPL and MRPK move in the same direction.
MRPL =
1
MX
i=1
1 Y i
wi
PiYi
PY
MRPK =
R
MX
i=1
1 Y i
1+Ki
PiYi
PY
To be noticed, the last equation of TFP in (27) indicates the mean of wedges 1  Y i and
1+ Ki do not have evident e¤ects on aggregate TFP. But the variance of TFPR and the
covariance between TFPR and TFPQ will produce impacts on aggregate TFP.
E¢ cient TFP and TFP Gain from removing distortions
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Now we discuss about the implication of misallocation for e¢ ciency. In the e¢ cient
case, marginal revenue product of labor and capital are equalized across rms. Finally,
MRPLi =MRPLj and MRPKi =MRPKj. From (15) and (16), we get
MRPLei = MRPL
e
j =MRPL
e ) wi
1  Y i =
wj
1  Y j = w
MRPKei = MRPK
e
i =MRPK
e ) R (1 + Ki)
1  Y i =
R (1 + Kj)
1  Y j = R
The above two equations imply that TFPRe = TFPRi = TFPRj. It gives e¢ cient level
of aggregate TFP as
Ae =
 
1
M
MX
i=1
A 1i
! 1
 1
(28)
Furthermore, the e¢ cient to distorted output ratio could be expressed as the ratio of TFP
dividing (28) by (26).
Y e
Y
=
Ae
TFP
=
"
MX
i=1

Ai
Ae
 TFPR
TFPRi
 1#  1 1
(29)
In other words, the TFP gain is the percentage of changing from distorted aggregate TFP
to e¢ cient TFP. Then TFPgain = Y gain = A
efficient
TFP
  1.
Additionally, from (29), the logarithm di¤erence between e¢ cient and actual TFP,
lnAe   lnTFP , relates to the di¤erence between lnTFPR and lnTFPRi. Thus when
lnTFPRi is far from the "average", lnTFPR, the di¤erence between lnAe and lnTFP
is enlarged. That is to say when the rms are more distorted, TFPR disperses more and
the TFP gain from removing distortions increases.
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4 Quantitative Analysis of Misallocation
This section compares Chilean to Norwegian manufacturing industry by using rm-level
data. The aim is to show to what extent the Chilean manufacturing is distorted by setting
Norwegian data as a benchmark case.
First, the data sources are introduced with basic descriptive statistics. Then we will
discuss the extent and misallocation, and analyze which particular distortion may have
accounted for most of the changing variance of TFPR in Chile and Norway.
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section, the preparation of the data is introduced. First, the sources of Chilean
and Norwegian Data are given out, and the perpetual inventory method is explained by
which we formulate capital stock in Chilean data. After that, the preliminary cleaning
methods are presented for both datasets. At last, the descriptive statistics are presented
for Chilean and Norwegian dataset.
4.1.1 Data Sources
Chilean Data
The Chilean data used in this analysis has two main sources: the data from Instituto
National de Estadistica (INE) of Chile covers 1980-1986, and the data from World Banks
report covers 1986-1996. The overlapped observations in 1986 from both sources are
tested and show a consistent match of the data. The entire dataset, 1980-1996, contains
78,889 observations across years and 9,778 rms before cleaning. Each rm hires 10 or
more workers annually. A large number of variables are included, for example four-digit
industry code (ISIC), business type, sales of product, material cost, location of producer,
etc. The identity test on income, output, and value-added shows high consistency of
variables. Most of the data are recorded in nominal price. Variables are in constant 1980
prices deated by various price deators on output, capital, intermediate, etc in three digit
industry level cited from Liu(1990). For example the real wage of white-collar employees
(wist) in plant i, industry s, year t should be written as:
wist =
PI tis 80
100
Wist
where PI tis 80 is the price index based on year 1980, andWist is the nominal wage of white
collars in plant i, year t.
The total gross capital includes stock of buildings, machinery, vehicles and other assets.
The capital series with one-year lag are dened both forward and backward through
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perpetual inventory method.
Kijt = (1  j)Kij(t 1) + Iijt
Here Kijt is the real gross capital in j (building, machinery, vehicle or other assets) for
plant i in year t. Iijt is the investment on related capital. In Chilean manufacturing,
investment is dened as the sum of values on consuming old and new capital goods,
selling capital goods, producing capital goods for own use and improving capital goods by
a third party. j is the depreciations rate for capital j. Following Liu(1990)s assumption,
 is set to be 5% for buildings, 10% for machinery and 20% for vehicles. Furthermore,
since some of the plants get exit the dataset and entry after more than one year, we
generate the capital stock of plant with n-year lag as
Kijt = (1  j)nKij(t n) + Iijt
We used either 1980 or 1981 as the base year to construct capital. As many rms have
missing capital values in 1980-based data but exist in 1981-based. Liu (1990) suggested
a method of capital composition for these two kinds of capital series. Capital equals to
1980-based value if the value exists in the data based on 1980. If not, capital is replaced
by the value based on 1981.
Norwegian Data
The Norwegian data is collected from the manufacturing Statistics and accounts sta-
tistics within the period 1996-2006. There are 93,578 observations with 16,049 rms
included. Only the joint-stock companies are recorded. The measurements include busi-
ness type, employment, investment, etc. The total investment is the sum of investments
in buildings, land and other tangible xed assets. The capital stocks are given in the
dataset which are estimated based on hybrid perpetual inventory method (Raknerud et.al
(2007)) All the variable are converted into real values in 1996.
Data cleaning
Several steps for data cleaning are implemented. Firstly, rms with top 0.1% of in-
vestment are dropped by pooling across years. Secondly, since we are going to do most
of the analysis in logarithmic values, it is necessary to drop rms with missing values
and non-positive measurements on capital, value added and wage. Thirdly, following
Gourio(2008)s criteria, we drop rms staying in dataset less than ve consecutive year
aiming to select a more reliable dataset. In addition, while dening entry and exit, we
keep rms who enter or exit no more than twice. We also discard the sole riders who are
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in the dataset for one year only, unless they appear in 1980 or 1996 in Chilean data and
1996 or 2006 in Norwegian data. All these cleaning processes eliminate rms for all the
years (balanced panel). So it will not a¤ect entry and exit analysis in the later section. At
last, because it includes rms with less than 10 employees in Norwegian manufacturing
statistics, we dene those rms exit the dataset when the number of employees is less
than 10. Thus we eliminate the rm-year observation when the rm has labors less than
10.
4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics
Before focusing on the productivity analysis, it is of great interest to have a brief discussion
on the aggregate value-added, investment-capital ratio and entry-exit analysis.
Figure 5 illustrates the aggregate manufacturing labor productivity detrended by 2.5%
per year2. It shows that the aggregate labor productivity in Chile decreased dramatically
in early 1980s and reached the level of 40% below the trend in 1987. One reason for this is
the country experienced severe nancial crisis when GDP dropped by 14.1% from 1982 to
1983 (Corbo and Fischer,1994). Chilean labor productivity increases in 1990s and reached
the level about 5% above the trend in 1996, whereas the Norwegian labor productivity
varied less and it also stopped at the 5% level above the trend in 2006.
Figure 6 presents similar investment-capital ratio in Chile as Fuentes et.al (2006) does.
It shows that the Norwegian aggregate investment-capital ratio is much higher which is
about 0.5 on average. This is to say Norway has higher investment on each capital good
than Chile. Whereas the investment-capital ratio is increasing in Chile but decreasing in
Norway.
The measurements of entry and exit are dened following Dunne et. al(1988)s equa-
tion. Measurements are given as
ER = EntryRatet =
#Entrantt
#Firmt 1
XR = ExitRatet 1 =
#Exitert 1
#Firmt 1
2We focus on the growth accouting between Chile and Norway in Figure 5. We set the average annual
growth of productivity in Norway as a bechmark value which is 2.5% from 1996 to 2006. Following
Bergoeing et.al (2007), the consturction of detrended labor productivity is according to
P det =
Pt
(1 + 5%)t tinitial
where tinitial is the initial year of the series. It equals to 1980 for Chile and 1996 for Norway.
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Figure 5: Aggregate Labor Productivity: detrended 2.5% per year
ESH = EntrantSharet =
OutputEntrantt
OutputTotalt
XSH = ExiterSharet 1 =
OutputExitert 1
OutputTotalt 1
ERS = EntrantSizet =
OutputEntrantt
#Entrantt
OutputTotalt OutputEntrantt
#Firmt #Entrantt
XRS = ExiterSizet 1 =
OutputExitert
#Exitert 1
#Firmt 1 OutputExitert 1
#Firmt 1 #Exitert 1
Table 1 shows that in Chile the entry rate increases while it decreases in Norway. The
entrants in Chile produce 11% of the manufacturing output on average, and Norwegian
entrants produce 26% which is also higher than 15.8% in U.S. (Dunne et.al,1988). Thus
the entrants in Norway contribute the most to the manufacturing output. In Chile and
Norway the entrant market share is lower than entry rate. In other words, entrants are
much smaller than the rms already in the market. Additionally, the average size of
entrants in Chile is about 33% of incumbents. While entrants in Norway has higher
entrant relative size towards survivorsaverage output, which is about 73%.
There is a similar analysis for exiters. The annual exit rate is about 26% in Chile
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Figure 6: Aggregate Investment-Captial Ratio
and 31% in Norway which are all lower than the measurements in U.S. Exiters in all the
countries are small rms with less market share than exit rate. In the "lost period" during
1980-1984 in Chile, there are more rms exit the market who have a high relative size
compared to survivors
4.2 Misallocation in Chile and Norway
In this section, we discuss the extent of misallocation in Chile and Norway. First, we
calibrate parameters and variables to calculate actual and e¢ cient aggregate TFP. Second,
we compare the distribution of productivity in both countries. We nd that TFPQ and
TFPR are more spread out in Chile than in Norway. At last, we decompose TFP gain
and show that output distortion is the main factor to explain resource misallocation in
Chile.
4.2.1 Computing Wedges
First of all, we introduce the formula to generate wedges in our data.
In the Chilean data, we include input price of capital for each year from World Bank
and Easterly et. al (1994) instead of setting R=0.1 in Hsieh and Klenow(2009). Since
capital price is the same across rms in a given year, the time-varied R will not a¤ect the
aggregate TFP and variance decomposition. Following Hsieh and Klenow(2005), we set
the elasticity in (10) as  = 3. Furthermore, since we plan to compare measures in Chile
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Chile
Year ER ESH ERS XR XSH XRS
1980-1984 0.177 0.077 0.322 0.311 0.094 0.230
1985-1990 0.280 0.123 0.388 0.227 0.045 0.162
1991-1996 0.390 0.127 0.280 0.245 0.080 0.267
Norway
Year ER ESH ERS XR XSH XRS
1996-2006 0.350 0.266 0.741 0.285 0.199 0.626
2001-2006 0.308 0.249 0.721 0.328 0.203 0.523
U.S. (from Dunne et.al, 1988)
Year ER ESH ERS XR XSH XRS
1963-1967 0.414 0.139 0.271 0.417 0.148 0.247
1967-1972 0.516 0.188 0.286 0.490 0.195 0.271
1972-1977 0.518 0.146 0.205 0.450 0.150 0.221
1977-1982 0.517 0.173 0.228 0.500 0.178 0.226
Table 1: Entry and Exit Statistics
and Norway with the United States, we set the capital shares of production s from US
data, which is s = 13 .
As the output Yi is unobservable from the data, we rearrange equations from the rst
order condition, and express distortions and productivity of rms in terms of revenue.
From (13) and (14), the wedges can be written as
1 + Ki =

1  
wiLi
RKi
(30)
1  Y i = 
   1
wiLi
(1  )PiYi (31)
Equation (30) shows that a positive capital distortion occurs when wage bill to capital
cost with input share ratio is high enough. In equation (31), a positive output distortion
occurs when the rate of wage bill to revenue is smaller enough.
From (11) and (12), the rms physical productivity Asi can be obtained
TFPQi , Ai = 
(PiYi)

 1
Ki L
1 
i
(32)
where  = (PY ) 
1
 1 =P
 is the same across plants and does not a¤ect gain of removing distortions, and PiYi
is observable from the data rather Yi: As a result, we set  = 1 as constant for all the
industries. In this case, the actual aggregate TFP in our analysis equals to TFP =1 =
Y
KL1 
1

= (PY )

 1
KL1  .
23
In order to have a reliable measure of the gain from misallocation, we drop 1% tails of
lnTFPRi
TFPR
and lnAi
Ae
by pooling all rm years, and recalculate aggregations and TFP. In this
way, trimming eliminates rms across years, it may lead errors when we decompose entry
and exit e¤ects on aggregate TFP. However the number of rms dropped is relatively
small in both countries. Thus the error is small.
4.2.2 Aggregate Total Factor Productivity
The aggregate TFP is computed according to (26) for Chile and Norway. To compare
between countries, we set measures from Norway as benchmark, and detrend aggregate
TFP in two countries for 4% o¤ which is the average growth rate of TFP in Norway
from data. Figure 7 shows that the Chilean manufacturing TFP was distorted in early
1980s, and TFP declined more than 40% from trend during crisis in 1980s. Since 1987,
the Chilean aggregate TFP increased rapidly. It reached the level about 18% above the
trend in 1996 . In Norway, the aggregate TFP did not change much from the trend. It
came back to the trend in the latest year and stop at the point about 5% below the trend.
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Figure 7: Aggregate Manufacturing TFP: detrended by 4% per year
To gure out the e¤ects of entry and exit on the growth of aggregate TFP, we extend
Bartelsman et. al.(2005) and Crespi(2006)s method (FHK method) to decompose annual
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growth rate of aggregate TFP as
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where
pTFPit =

Ait
TFPRt
TFPRit
 1
P TFPt =
MsX
i=1

Ait
TFPRt
TFPRit
 1
it  TFP  1t
Here it = LitLt is the labor share. Pt is the weighted average of pit. It approximately
equals to the squared TFP with  = 3. In (33) Ct represents continuing rms who
are recorded in year t and year t + 1. Nt represents entrants who have missing records
in year t   1 but appear in year t. Xt presents exiting rms who leave the survey in
year t+ 1. Following Foster et.al(2001), the rst component in (33) captures the growth
rate of within-rm e¤ect. The second term represents the growth of between-rm e¤ect
which is a (squared) productivity di¤erence weighted by varying labor share. The third
term is called the growth of cross e¤ect. It gives covariance between the labor share and
productivity (squared). The fourth component shows the growth of entry e¤ect which
sums the (squared) productivity change rate of entrants. The last term in (33) is the
growth rate of exit e¤ect. It sums the (squared) productivity gap of exiters weighted with
labor share.
Figure 8 and Figure 9 graph the decomposition of TFP growth in Chile and Norway
according to equation (33)3. The net entry e¤ect equals entry e¤ect minus exit. Figure 8
shows that in Chile the annual growth of squared TFP is explained mainly by the within-
rm e¤ect. The overall annual growth rate uctuates from -0.5 to 0.7 approximately.
Figure 9 shows that in Norway both within e¤ect and net entry e¤ect have large inuence
onto the overall growth. However, each growth e¤ects is stable with smaller magnitude,
and the overall annual growth rate in Norway varies from -0.02 to 0.17 only.
3Decomposition analysis of TFP growth following Foster er. al (2009) gives:
annual growth =within e¤ect +between e¤ect+cross e¤ect+net entry e¤ect
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Figure 8: Decomposition of TFP Growth in Chile 1980-1996:
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4.2.3 E¢ ciency Gains
The TFP gain from removing distortions is dened as the relative di¤erence between the
TFP and its e¢ cient level which can be written as
TFPgain =
Ye
Y
  1 = TFPe
TFP
  1
Figure 10 depicts the TFP gain in Chile and Norway. It shows that the e¢ ciency gain
from removing misallocation decreases from 154% to 59% in Chile. But the gain in
Norway is relatively small. It varies from 24% to 29% which is more stable. Thus Chilean
manufacturing industry will obtain more growth of total output by improving industry
productivity into e¢ cient level. It also means that the production inputs in Chile is more
distorted than in Norway.
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Figure 10: TFP Gain from Reallocation
4.2.4 Size Distribution
According to equation (16), we write the actual and e¢ cient size of rm as
PiYi =
A 1i (1   yi) 1
(1 + Ki)
( 1)
"

   1

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
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Here we set w as the mean value of wi which is constant across rms in the e¢ cient
case. In Figure 11, we plot actual and e¢ cient size distribution (adjusted to the mean)
in logarithmic value according to equation (34) and (35). Figure 11 shows that for both
countries in the latest year, the e¢ cient size distribution is more spread out and has lower
density in the mean size. This implies that the e¢ cient resource allocation enlarges size
di¤erence among rms. As the size distribution has thicker tails in Chile, the di¤erence
of e¢ cient size among rms is larger in Chile than in Norway.
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Figure 11: Distribution of Size
4.2.5 TFPR and TFPQ Dispersion
Figure 12 shows the distribution of lnTFPQ, ln Ai
mean(Ai)
, for Chile in 1996 and for Norway
in 2006. It shows that TFPQ is more dispersed in Chile with thicker tails. It means
that there is larger productivity di¤erence between the most and least productive rms
in Chilean manufacturing. In contrast, in Norway, the productivity di¤erence is moder-
ate. Table 2 gives a consistent message where Chile has the highest ratio of 75th to 25th
percentiles and 90th to 10th percentiles of TFPQ. For Norway, most measures appear
fairly stable with less changes. The productivity of rms in Norway is more evenly dis-
tributed than in the US. However, the dispersion of TFPQ in the US cited from Hsieh
and Klenow(2005) is computed using annual sector average which may be not comparable
with our results.
Figure 13 shows the distribution of lnTFPR, ln TFPRi
mean(TFPRi)
; adjusted by the mean
of lnTFPR in the latest year of each country. The TFPR in Chile is more spread-out
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Figure 12: Distribution of lnTFPQ
with heavy tails. Consistent with Figure 13, Table 3 shows lower standard deviation and
interquartile range in Norway. The highest standard deviation in Chile indicates that the
dispersion of TFPR is larger in Chile. Whereas, in Chile, the standard deviation of TFPR
in Table 3 drops 28% between 1980 and 1996 which shows decreasing TFPR dispersion
in Chile.
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Figure 13: Distribution of lnTFPR
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Chile
1980 1988 1996
SD 1.28 1.27 1.15
p75-p25 1.74 1.81 1.59
p90-p10 3.39 3.33 2.98
Norway
1996 2000 2006
SD 0.66 0.66 0.69
p75-p25 0.86 0.81 0.90
p90-p10 1.65 1.62 1.78
U.S. (from Hsieh and Klenow, 2009)
1977 1987 1997
SD 0.85 0.79 0.84
p75-p25 1.22 1.09 1.17
p90-p10 2.22 2.05 2.18
Table 2: Dispersion of TFPQ
Chile
1980 1988 1996
SD 0.81 0.67 0.58
p75-p25 0.99 0.92 0.73
p90-p10 2.05 1.71 1.47
Norway
1996 2000 2006
SD 0.31 0.29 0.33
p75-p25 0.39 0.38 0.43
p90-p10 0.78 0.74 0.85
U.S. (from Hsieh and Klenow, 2009)
1977 1987 1997
SD 0.45 0.41 0.49
p75-p25 0.46 0.41 0.53
p90-p10 1.04 1.01 1.19
Table 3: Dispersion of TFPR
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4.2.6 Variance Decomposition
In this section, we show that there is a similar pattern between (lnTFP e lnTFP ) and the
variance of lnTFPR. The variables are decomposed in two way: variance decomposition
and quintile decomposition. We nd that in Chile the variance of output distortion and its
between-quintile e¤ect are the main elements of decreasing e¢ cient gain. All the measures
in Norwegian data are fairly stable with small magnitude.
TFPR and TFP gain
Equation (27) shows that the aggregate TFP is expressed as a CES function of the
"average" TFPR and rms TFPR. Then we plot the variance of TFPR with lnTFP gain
(lnTFP e   lnTFP ) in Figure 14. It shows that the Chilean TFP gain decreases from
0.85 in 1983 to 0.55 in 1990. The trend of lnTFP gain tend to have a similar pattern as
the decreasing var(lnTFPR) from 1986. The nancial reform during 1983-1992 in Chile
can explain the increase of aggregate TFP. The tax reform in 1984-1985 and the trade
policy since 1985 are the reasons of decreasing var(lnTFPR). The tax reform removes the
high tax on rmsprot from 50% to 10%, and the trade policy decreases tari¤s to 25%
(Brock, 2009). However, in Norway, lnTFP gain and var(lnTFPR) are stable and with
lower magnitude. The variance of lnTFPR maintains at the level of 0.1 from 1996 to
2006.
From equation (20), we can decompose the variance of lnTFPR as
var (log TFPRi) = 
2var (logMRPKi) + (1  )2 var (logMRPLi) (36)
+2 (1  ) cov (logMRPKi; logMRPLi)
In Figure 15, we plot components of var(lnTFPR) according to (36). It shows that
in Chile the main component explaining the change in var(lnTFPR) is var(lnMRPL),
while cov(lnMRPL lnMRPK) also has similar pattern. The var(lnMRPL) component
decreases from 1986 to 1994. It accounts for 60% of the var(lnTFPR) on average, while
the var(lnMRPK) component is about 28%. The cov(lnMRPL, lnMRPK) changes to
negative after 1991. In Norway, each component appears steady trend at low magnitude.
However, the var(lnMRPK) component accounts for more than 60% to the variance of
lnTFPR. This means the variance of lnMRPK in Norway has more impact onto the
change of var(lnTFPR) than that in Chile. Moreover, the marginal revenue products
are negative correlated during 1996-2006 in Norway. Thus in Norway, the high MRPL
decreases MRPK.
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Figure 14: lnTFP Gain and var(lnTFPRsi)
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Figure 15: Decomposition of var(lnTFPR)
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Next, we extends Davis and Haltiwanger (1991)s method to decompose variance of
TFPR for di¤erent lnAi quintiles (see Appendix III for details ). The var(lnTFPR) equals
var(lnTFPRi) =
1
N
QX
q
NqX
i
 
lnTFPRqi   lnTFPR
2
| {z }
over all variation
=
QX
q
Nq
N
var(lnTFPR)q| {z }
within group component
+
QX
q
Nq
N
 
lnTFPRq   lnTFPR
2
| {z }
between group component
(37)
where lnTFPR is the overall mean of TFPRi. Here var(lnTFPR)q is the variance for
lnTFPR in each quintile q. lnTFPRq is the mean of lnTFPR in quintile q. N is total
number of rm. Nq is the number of rm in the qth quintile. As we group lnAi into
quintiles, Nq
N
= 1
5
. We dene the rst term in (37) as within-group component which is
the sum of quintile variances weighted by observation rate in each quintile group. The
second component is called between-group component which adds up squared di¤erence
between quintile mean and overall mean weighted by the observation rate in each quintile.
Figure 16 plots the decomposition of var(lnTFPR) for di¤erent lnAi quintiles accord-
ing to equation (37). In Chile, the between-group component accounts for most of the
change in var(lnTFPR). In contrast, in Norway, the gure shows that the within-group
component is larger. But since each component in Norway is relatively steady and has
small magnitude, it is ambiguous to tell the which component represents large proportion.
As TFPR is price times TFPQ, higher TFPR implies higher productivity in the rm.
Also because the between-group component explains the "variance" of mean, the high(low)
productivity rm with high(low) TFPR value implies large di¤erence between top (bot-
tom) quintile mean and overall mean. Thus in Figure 17, the 1st and 5th quintile of pro-
ductivity explain the most change of between group variance in var(lnTFPR) for Chile
and Norway. In addition, in both Chile and Norway the mean di¤erence in lower end
of the lnAi distribution always lies above the upper end. This indicates that the least
productive rm has higher TFPR di¤erence with the average TFPR, whereas the most
productive rm has less TFPR di¤erence comparing to the mean.
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Figure 16: var(lnTFPR): lnAsi quintiles
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Figure 17: var(lnTFPR): Between-Group Component
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MRPL
To understand why the variance of lnTFPR has decreased in Chilean manufacturing,
we decompose variance of lnMRPL according to (16).
var (logMRPLi) = var (logwi) + var (log (1  Y i)) (38)
 2cov (logwi; log (1  Y i))
Figure 18 shows that Norway has more steady trend and lower level of each component
in var(lnMRPL). In contrast, in Chile the main component explaining the decreasing
of var(lnMRPL) in 1986-1994 is the variance of output wedges. The var(ln(1    yi))
accounts for more than 50% of the var(lnMRPL) on average. One possibility of decreasing
var(lnMRPL) can be explained by the elimination of wage indexation policy since 1982
which decreases real wages (Corbo and Fischer,1994 ;Bergoeing et.al, 2007).
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Figure 18: Decomposition of var(lnMRPL)
Similarly, we study quintile analysis of var(lnMRPL). The result shows that in Chile
the between-group component represents 70% of var(lnMRPL) on average which mainly
explains the drop in var(lnMRPL). In Norway, the at trend and low value of components
result less change in lnMRPL from 1996 to 2006. Moreover, in both Chile and Norway,
the changes of the mean lnMRPL in the lower and upper end of the productivity dis-
tribution are the main factors explaining the trend in the between-group component of
var(lnMRPL).
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cov(lnMRPL, lnMRPK)
Recall from previous analysis, cov(lnMRPL, lnMRPK) has similar pattern as the vari-
ance of lnTFPR. Now we use equation (15) and (16) to decompose cov(lnMRPL, lnM-
RPK) as
cov (lnMRPKi; lnMRPLi) = var (ln (1  Y i))  cov (ln (1 + Ki) ; ln (1  Y i))
+cov (lnwi; ln (1 + Ki))  cov (lnwi; ln (1  Y i))(39)
Figure 19 presents that in Chile, the main driving force of decreasing cov(lnMRPK,
lnMRPL) from 1986 is var (ln (1  Y i)). In Norway, the high and positive covariance
between wedges is the main reason of negative cov(lnMRPK, lnMRPL).
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Figure 19: Decomposition of cov(lnMRPL,lnMRPK)
Output distortion
Finally, as we shown that the var (ln (1  Y i)) in Chile is the main component explain-
ing the changes in var(lnMRPL) and cov(lnMRPL, lnMRPK), we decompose var (ln (1  Y i))
into between- and within-group e¤ects in Figure 20. In Chile, both within- and between-
group component explain the the trend of the var(ln (1  Y i)). But the between-group
e¤ect has stronger driving force to the decreasing var(ln (1  Y i)) during 1986-1993.
However, in Norway, the between-group component varies slightly around 0.01 which
represents weak driving force to the variance of output distortion.
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Figure 20: var (ln (1  Y i)) : lnAsi quintiles
Figure 21 illustrates that the changes of ln (1  Y i)q (the quintile mean) in the 1st and
5th quintile are the dominating e¤ects explaining the trend of between-group component
which has a dramatic drop in Chile and an insignicant rise in Norway. Relating to
policies in Chile, the least and most productive rms are more sensitive to the tax reform
and trade policy since 1985 which decrease the high marginal income tax and tari¤s
respectively (Brock, 2009).
Furthermore, in Chile and Norway the cov(ln (1  Y i) ; lnTFPQi) is stable and neg-
ative in the most and least productive rms from the data. The overall covariance retains
the level at about -0.7 in Chile and -0.4 in Norway. That is to say, the output wedges have
negative correlation with rm productivity in the top and bottom productivity quintiles.
Then the mean of ln (1  Y i) in lower quintile is higher than the overall mean. Addition-
ally, we nd that the overall mean ln (1  Y i) in Chile increases during 1986-1993. Thus
in Figure 21 in Chile, when the between-group component of ln (1  Y i) in the lower
end quintile falls rapidly during 1986-1993, the lower end quintile mean of ln (1  Y i)
approaches to the overall mean in a faster speed. Hence we can conclude that in Chile the
fast approaching of quintile mean to the overall mean of output wedges in low productive
rms mainly explains the change in var(ln (1  Y i)). In other words, less distortion in
low productive rm is a strong driving force to the increasing TFP in Chile since 1986.
One possible explanation could be that the Chilean reform policies since 1986 were more
e¤ective on decreasing distortions from the low productive rms, which drove falling TFP
gain.
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Figure 21: var (ln (1   yi)) : Between-Group Decomposition
5 Conclusion
This paper uses Hsieh and Klenow (2009)s accounting methodology to describe the pat-
tern of the misallocation and aggregate TFP. We calibrate the model and compare rm-
level data for Chile during 1980-1996 and Norway during 1996-2006.
We compare detrended aggregate TFP between Chile and Norway. The study shows
that the detrended TFP in Norway is fairly stable. The TFP growth in Norway is mainly
driven by between e¤ect and net exit e¤ect. In contrast, Chile experiences big swings in
aggregate TFP which is explained mainly by the within e¤ect.
We compute TFP relative to e¢ cient TFP by assuming zero distortion and constant
wage rate across rms. The result shows that the gain from removing distortions in
Chile decreases rapidly from 154% to 59% during 1980-1990. While the gain in Norway
is fairly stable around 26%. It also means that the production inputs in Chile is more
distorted than in Norway. In addition, we compare the size distribution. In Chile and
Norway the equalizing TFPR gives more spread-out of size distribution. Both distorted
and e¢ cient size distribution are more dispersed in Chile. Moreover, the distribution of
TFPQ adjusted to the mean gives thicker tails for the latest year in Chile which means
rms in Chile had larger e¢ ciency di¤erence in 1996, while the Norwegian productivity
was almost evenly distributed across rms in 2006.
As TFP can be expressed as the relative ratio between "average" TFPR and TFPR, the
variance of lnTFPR appears a similar trend as lnTFPe-lnTFP in our data. That is to say
the var(lnTFPR) explains most of the changes in the e¢ cient gain. The variance decom-
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position shows that in Chile the main component explaining the decreasing var(lnTFPR)
is var(lnMRPL), which can be explained by the trend in the var(ln (1  Y i)). However in
Norway, the components of var(lnTFPR) are stable, and the variance of MRPK accounts
for higher proportion of the change in var(lnTFPR).
After that, the variances are decomposed into di¤erent productivity quintiles. The
quintile analysis shows that in Norway, the subgroup variance (within-group) of ln (1  Y i)
explains more of the trend in var(ln (1  Y i)). Whereas, in Chile, falls in the mean value
of ln (1  Y i) relative to the overall mean (between-group) at both end of the distribu-
tion explain mainly the fall in var(ln (1  Y i)). Thus the output distortions in both less
and most productive rms are the main factors explaining decreasing variance of output
wedges. Furthermore, since we nd increasing overall mean of ln (1  Y i) and negative
cov(ln (1  Y i), lnTFPQi) , the large drop of ln (1  Y i)q ln (1  Y i) in low productive
rm indicates less decreasing output distortion in ine¢ cient rms. This suggests that in
Chile, the less distortion faced by low productive rms is a stronger driving force to the
increasing TFP in Chile since 1986.
We conjecture that in Chile the dramatic drop in TFP gain is caused by a series of
reform policies after the crisis which includes the bankruptcy law in 1982, the market-
determined interest rate since 1982 and the tax reform in 1984. These reforms drop the
output distortion in Chile and result rising manufacturing aggregate TFP while the TFP
gain decreases.
There are some limitations in our result. The dataset used for two countries are in
di¤erent timeline. In addition, we can not depart distortion on labor from the recent
model. Thus in future research we could introduce Li by adding intermediates as input,
and discuss how the resource misallocation a¤ects aggregate TFP.
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6 Appendix I. Derivation of Two-rm Case
This part give the derivation of equations in the two-rm case.
6.1 Final Good
max
Y1;Y2
: = Y   (P1Y1 + P2Y2)
s:t: :
Y =

Y
 1

1 + Y
 1

2
 
 1
(40)
First order condition gives
Yi =
1
P i
Y (41)
where P = 1
6.2 Intermediate Good
The production function for rms are
Yi = AiK

i L
1 
i (42)
Prot maximization for rm 1
max
L1;K1;P1
1 = (1  )P1A1Ka1L1 1   wL1  RK1 (43)
s:t: : Y1 = P
 
1  Y (44)
for rm 2
max
L2;K21;P2
2 = P2A2K
a
2L
1 
2   wL2  RK2 (45)
s:t: : Y2 = P
 
2  Y (46)
The Lagrangians are
L1 = (1  )P1A1Ka1L1 1   wLsi  RKsi   1
 
A1K
a
1L
1 
1   Y

1
P1
 !
(47)
L2 = P2A2Ka2L1 2   wLsi  RKsi   2
 
A2K
a
2L
1 
2   Y

1
P2
 !
(48)
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The rst order conditions from (47) and (48) give
K1
L1
=
w
R

1   =
K2
L2
(49)
and
P1 =

   1
 
R

   w
1 
1 
A1
1
1   (50)
P2 =

   1
 
R

   w
1 
1 
A2
(51)
We express Li and Ki in terms of Y; by inserting (49) into (42) then combing with
(41). Labor demands are
L1 = A
 1
1 (1  )

   1

 
R

(1 )
w
1  
( 1) 
Y (52)
L2 = A
 1
2

   1

 
R

(1 )
w
1  
( 1) 
Y (53)
Dividing (52) by (53), labor demand ratio is
L1
L2
=
A 11 (1  )
A 12
Capital demands are
K1 = A
 1
1 (1  )

   1

 
R

(1 ) 1
w
1  
( 1)( 1)
Y (54)
K2 = A
 1
2

   1

 
R

(1 ) 1
w
1  
( 1)( 1)
Y (55)
Dividing (54) by (55), capital demand ratio is
K1
K2
=
A 11 (1  )
A 12
We also compute Y1 and Y2 by rewrite (42) as
Ysi = Asi

Ksi
Lsi
s
Lsi
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Inserting (49) (52) and (53), rm output is
Y1 = A1

w
R

1  

L1
= A1 (1  )

   1

 
R
 1  
w
(1 )
Y (56)
Y2 = A

2

   1

 
R
 1  
w
(1 )
Y (57)
Now we insert (56) and (57) into (40)
Y = Y
"
   1


R
1  
w
1 # 
A 11 (1  ) 1 + A 12
 
 1 (58)
(58) gives factor price equals

   1

w
1  
1 
R


=

A 11 (1  ) 1 + A 12
 1
 1 (59)
We dene MRPK1 = @P1Y1@K1 and MRPL2 =
@P2Y2
@L2
: Accordingly,
MRPLi = (1  )    1

PiYi
Ki
=) Li = (1  )PiYiMRPL 1i
   1

(60)
MRPKi = 
   1

PiYi
Ki
=) Ksi = PiYiMRPK 1i
   1

(61)
We can also have marginal revenue products as function of distortion and input prices by
plugging (50) (51) (42) and (49) into (60) and (61).
MRPK1 =
R
1  
MRPK2 = R
MRPL1 =
w
1  
MRPL2 = w
The revenue based TFP could be rewritten with marginal revenue of products as
TFPRi =
PiYi
(Ki)
 (Li)
1 
=

   1

MRPKi


MRPLi
1  
1 
(62)
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Then
TFPR1 =

   1

R


w
1  
1 
1
(1  ) (63)
TFPR2 =

   1

R


w
1  
1 
(64)
We dene TFPR as a kind of average of TFPRi
TFPR =

 1
 
w
1 
1   R


(1  ) P1Y1
Y
+ P2Y2
Y
(65)
Inserting (41) (50) and (51) into (65)
TFPR =
h

 1
 
w
1 
1   R

i
A 11 (1  ) + A 12
(66)
We insert factor price (59) into (66)
TFPR =

A 11 (1  ) 1 + A 12
 1
 1 (67)
6.3 Aggregate TFP
On one hand, we use growth accounting to derive TFP as
TFP aggregates =
Y
KL1 
(68)
Adding (52) and (53) up, aggregate labor is
L = L1 + L2
=

A 11 (1  ) + A 12
   1

 
R

(1 )
w
1  
( 1) 
Y (69)
From (54) and (55), aggregate capital is
K = K1 +K2
=

A 11 (1  ) + A 12
   1

 
R

(1 ) 1
w
1  
( 1)( 1)
Y (70)
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Inserting (69) and (70) into (68)
TFP aggregates =
h

 1
 
W
1 
1   R

i
A 11 (1  ) 1 + A 12
 
A 11 (1  ) 1 + A 12
1 
=
h

 1
 
W
1 
1   R

i
A 11 (1  ) + A 12
(71)
We substitute factor price in (71), then TFP aggregates becomes
TFP aggregates =

A 11 (1  ) 1 + A 12
 
 1
A 11 (1  ) + A 12
(72)
On the other hand we nd another method to compute TFP by using TFPR from (63)
and (64).
TFP TFPR =
"
A1
TFPR
TFPR1
 1
+

A2
TFPR
TFPR2
 1# 1 1
=

A 11 (1  ) 1 + A 12
 
 1
A 11 (1  ) + A 12
(73)
(72) and (73) illustrate the same result. Thus
TFP =
Y
KL1 
=
"
A1
TFPR
TFPR1
 1
+

A2
TFPR
TFPR2
 1# 1 1
=

A 11 (1  ) 1 + A 12
 
 1
A 11 (1  ) + A 12
(74)
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7 Appendix II. Derivation of Multiple-Firm Case
Here we show the derivations in the multiple-rm case in Section 3.
7.1 Final Sector
For each industry, output is a CES aggregator over Ms di¤erentiated products
Each industry decides
max
Yi
PY  
X
PiYi
st :
Y =
 
MsX
i=1
Y
 1

i
! 
 1
(75)
Solve this problem and show optimally condition.
L = P 
 
MX
i=1
Y
 1

i
! 
 1
 
X
PiYi
First order condition gives
@L
@Yi
) Pi = P 
 
MX
i=1
Y
 1

i
! 
 1 1
 Y
 1

 1
i (76)
@L
@Yj
) Pj = P 
 
MsX
i=1
Y
 1

i
! 
 1 1
 Y
 1

 1
j (77)
Dividing (76) by (77), we get
Pi
Pj
=

Yj
Yi
 1

(78)
Then rearrange (78),
Y
1

i = P
 1
i  Pj  Y
1

j
MsX
i=1
Y
 1

i =
MsX
i=1

P 1 i  P  1j  Y
 1

j

 
MsX
i=1
Y
 1

i
! 
 1
=
 
P  1j  Y
 1

j 
MsX
i=1
P 1 i
! 
 1
Y = P j  Yj 
 
MX
i=1
P 1 i
! 
 1
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Show Yj as
Yj =
P j
MP
i=1
P 1 i
  
1 
 Y
Rewrite output of each rm Yi
Yi =
P i
P 
 Y (79)
Dene price index as
P =
 
MX
k=1
P 1 k
! 1
1 
(80)
7.2 Intermediate Sector
Within the manufacturing, producers produce di¤erentiates goods that are monopolisti-
cally competitive. For each i producer, the production technology is Cobb-Douglas
Yi = AiK
a
i L
1 
i (81)
max
Li;Ki;Pi
i = (1  Y i)PiAiKai L1 i   wiLi  R(1 +  i)Ki (82)
st :
Yi =
P i
P 
 Y
The Lagrangian gives
L = (1  Y i)PiAiKi L1 i   wiLi   (1 + Ki)RKi   
"
AiK

i L
1 
i   Y

P
Pi
 #
First order condition gives
(1  Y i)Yi   Y P
 1
i
P 
= 0 (83)
 [(1  Y i)Pi   ]AiK 1i L1 i   (1 + Ki)R = 0 (84)
(1  ) [(1  Y i)Pi   ]AiKi L i   wi = 0 (85)
Equation (84) and (85) implies
Ki
Li
=
wi
R

1  
1
1 + Ki
(86)
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Plugging equation (86) into (81), we get
Li = A
 1
i


1   
wi
(1 + Ki)R
 
Yi (87)
Ki = A
 1
i


1  
wi
(1 + Ki)R
1 
Yi (88)
The unit cost function is
c =
wiLsi +R (1 +  ksi)Ksi
Ysi
=

R


wi
1  
1 
(1 + Ki)

Ai
(89)
Equation (83) gives
 =
(1  Y i)Pi

(90)
Plugging (86) and (90) into (85), we get
Pi =

   1
1
1  Y i  c
=

   1
1
1  Y i

R


wi
1  
1 
(1 + Ki)

Ai
(91)
The optimal price is a markup over the unit cost, multiplied by the distortion.
7.3 Li; Ki, and Yi
Insert (91) for Pi into (79), we get the function of output as
Yi =
P i
P 
Y
=


   1
1
1  Y iMC
 
P Y
=

   1

 
R
 1  
wi
(1 )
Ai (1  Y i)
(1 + Ki)
P Y (92)
From (92), the output level has a common parameter among di¤erent rms, then
Yi / A

i (1  Y i)
(1 + Ki)
(93)
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Then insert (92) into (75), we have
Y =
"
MsX
i=1
Y
 1

i
# 
 1
=
24 MX
i=1
 
Ai (1  Y i)
(1 + Ki)


   1

 
R
 1  
W
(1 )
Y
! 1

35

 1
= Y

   1


R

(1  )1 
 " MX
i=1

Ai
1  Y i
w1 i (1 + Ki)

 1#  1
which gives

   1

1
1  
1 
R


=
"
MX
i=1

Ai
1  Y i
w1 i (1 + Ki)

 1# 1 1
(94)
Insert (92) into (87), labor demand is
Li = A
 1
i


1  
wi
(1 + Ki)R
 
Yi
= A 1i


1  
wi
(1 + Ki)R
 
   1

 
R
 1  
wi
(1 )
Ai (1  Y i)
(1 + Ki)
P Y
=

   1

 
R
( 1)1  
wi
(1 )+
A 1i (1  Y i)
(1 + Ki)( 1)
P Y (95)
then
Lsi / A
 1
si (1  Y si)
(1 + Ksi)s( 1)
(96)
The same process for Ki, it can be achieved by inserting (92) into (88)
Ki = A
 1
i


1  
wi
(1 + Ki)R
1 
Yi
= A 1i


1  
wi
(1 + Ki)R
1 
   1

 
R
 1  
wi
(1 )
Ai (1  Y si)
(1 + Ki)
P Y
=

   1




R
( 1)+11  
wsi
(1 )( 1)
A 1i (1  Y i)
(1 + Ki)( 1)+1
P Y (97)
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then
Ki / A
 1
i (1  Y i)
(1 + Ki)( 1)+1
(98)
7.4 MRPL and MRPK
The distortions Y i and Ki result di¤erences in MRPL and MRPK across rms. Thus
the allocation of resources across rms are di¤erent.
We rearrange (79)
Pi = PY
1
Y
  1

i
Then write revenue as
R = PiYi = Y
 1

i PY
1
 (99)
Di¤erentiate (99) to labor and solve for MRPLi
MRPLi =
@PiYi
@Li
=
   1

Y
  1

i PY
1
 (1  )AiKsi L i
= (1  )   1

PiAiK

i L
 
i
, (1  )   1

PiYi
Li
(100)
Insert (87) and (91) into (100), and get MRPLi as
MRPLi = wi
1
1  Y i (101)
Di¤erentiate (99) to capital and solve for MRPKi
MRPKi =
@PiYi
@Ki
=
   1

Y
  1

i PY
1
AiK
 1
i L
1 
i
= 
   1

PiAiK
 1
i L
1 
i
,    1

PiYi
Ki
(102)
Insert (88) and (91) into (102), and get MRPKi as
MRPKi = R
1 + Ki
1  Y i (103)
7.5 TFPR and TFPQ
Firms revenue productivity is a measure of rm-specic distortions (TFPRi). Hiseh and
Klenow (2009) dene the total factor productivity revenue TFPRi as
52
TFPRi , PiAi =
PiYi
Ki Li
1  (104)
TFPQi , Ai =
Yi
Ki Li
1 
Rearrange (100) and (102)
Li = (1  )   1

PiYiMRPL
 1
i (105)
Ki = 
   1

PiYiMRPK
 1
i (106)
Insert (105) and (106) into (104) solve for TFPRi which is a geometric average of marginal
revenue product of capital and labor
TFPRi =
PiYi 
 1

PiYiMRPK
 1
i
 
(1  ) 1

PiYiMRPL
 1
i
1 
=

   1

MRPKi


MRPLi
1  
1 
(107)
Insert (101) and (103) into (107) to get TFPRsi,
TFPRi =

   1

R


1
1  
1 
(1 + Ki)
w1 i
1  Y i (108)
=
"
MX
i=1

Ai
(1  Y i)
(1 + Ki)

 1# 1 1
(1 + Ki)
w1 i
1  Y i (109)
Where the last equality is derived using 94.
7.6 Aggregate Labor and Capital
Rearranging (100) and (101), we get
Li = (1  )   1

1  Y i
wi
PiYi (110)
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Sum over all i in (110)
L =
MsX
i=1
Li =
MsX
i=1
(1  )   1

1  Y i
wi
PiYi
=
   1

(1  )
MX
i=1
(1  Y i)
wi
PiYi (111)
Multiply and divide by PsYs on right side of (111)
L = PY
   1

(1  )
MX
i=1
1  Y i
wi
PiYi
PY
(112)
Similar for capital, we rearrange (102) and (103), and get
Ki = 
   1

1  Y i
R (1 + Ki)
PiYi (113)
Then sum over all i in (113)
K =
MX
i=1
Ki =
MX
i=1

   1

1  Y i
R (1 + Ki)
PiYi
=

R
   1

MX
i=1
1  Y i
1 + Ki
PiYi
= PY
   1


R
MX
i=1
1  Y i
1 + Ki
PiYi
PY
(114)
7.7 Denition of MRPLs, MRPKs and TFPRs
We dene
MRPL =
1
MX
i=1
1 Y i
wi
PiYi
PY
MRPK =
R
MX
i=1
1 Y i
1+Ki
PiYi
PY
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and TFPR is the geometric average of the MRPK and MRPL:
TFPR =

   1

MRPK


MRPL
1  
1 
=

   1
0BBBB@ R

MX
i=1
1 Y i
1+Ki
PiYi
PY
1CCCCA
0BBBB@ 1
(1  )
MX
i=1
1 Y i
wi
PiYi
PY
1CCCCA
1 
(115)
7.8 Aggregate TFP
Here we are going to compute TFPs by using two methods. The rst method is to derive
TFP as a function of TFPR in Hiseh and Klenow (2009). The second is to use the growth
accounting with aggregate inputs. The aim of doing this is to see whether these two
methods can derive the same result of TFP.
Method 1: TFPs as a function of TFPR
In here, we follow the denition of TFPs of Hsieh and Klenow at equation (15)
TFP =
"
1
M
MX
i=1

Ai
TFPR
TFPRi
 1# 1 1
(116)
Plugging equation (108) and (115) into (116), we get
TFP =
2666664
1
M
MX
i=1
0BBBBB@Ai
1 Y i
(1+Ki)
w1 i"
MX
i=1
1 Y i
wi
PiYi
PY
#1  " MX
i=1
1 Y i
1+Ki
PiYi
PY
#
1CCCCCA
 13777775
1
 1
=
"
1
M
MX
i=1

Ai
1 Y i
(1+Ki)
w1 i
 1# 1 1
 
MX
i=1
1 Y i
wi
PiYi
PY
!1  MX
i=1
1 Y i
1+Ki
PiYi
PY
! (117)
Method 2: TFPs as a function of aggregate inputs
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We use growth accounting.
TFP =
Y
(M)
1
 1 KL1 
=
"
MX
i=1
 
AiK

i L
1 
i
 1

# 
 1
(M)
1
 1 KL1 
=
1
(M)
1
 1
24 MX
i=1
 
Ai

Ki
K

Li
L
1 ! 1 35

 1
(118)
We divide (110) by (112), and (113) by (114), we get input shares are
Ki
K
=
1 Y i
1+Ki
PiYi
MX
j=1
1 Y j
1+Kj
PjYj
(119)
Li
L
=
1 Y i
wi
PiYi
MX
j=1
1 Y j
wj
PjYj
(120)
Plugging (119) and (120) into (118), we get
TFP =

1
M
 1
 1
"
MX
i=1

Ai(1 Y i)
(1+Ki)
w1 i
PiYi
PY
 1

# 
 1
 
MX
i=1
1 Y i
1+Ki
PiYi
PY
! MX
i=1
1 Y i
wi
PiYi
PY
!1  (121)
To solve for PiYi
PY
; we rearrange (79)
PiYi
PY
=

Yi
Y
 1

=
"
Ai (1  Y i)
(1 +  ki)


1  
wi
1  
R
    1

# 1
(122)
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which delivers.
Ai
(1  Y i)
(1 +  ki)

PiYi
PY
=

Ai
(1  Y i)
(1 + Ki)

 1
w 1i

(1  )1 

R
    1

 1
=

Ai (1  Y i)
w1 i (1 + Ki)

 1 " MX
i=1

Ai (1  Y i)
w1 i (1 + Ki)

 1# 1
(123)
We insert (94) in the last equality. Then Plugging (123) into the numerator of 121, we
get "
MX
i=1

Ai (1  Y i)
w1 i (1 + Ki)
PiYi
 1

# 
 1
=
"
MX
i=1

Ai (1  Y i)
w1 i (1 + Ki)

 1#  1 " MX
i=1

Ai (1  Y i)
w1 i (1 + Ki)

 1# 1
=
"
MX
i=1

Ai (1  Y i)
w1 i (1 + Ki)

 1# 1 1
(124)
Plug (124) back to (121), we get
TFP =
"
1
M
MX
i=1

Ai(1 Y i)
w1 i (1+Ki)

 1# 1 1
 
MX
i=1
1 Y i
wi
PiYi
PY
!1  MX
i=1
1 Y i
1+Ki
PiYi
PY
! (125)
Equation(125) is the same as (117). Thus
TFP ,

1
M
 1
 1 Y
KL1 
=
"
1
M
MX
i=1

Ai  TFPR
TFPRi
 1# 1 1
Then we insert (122) and (94) into (125), to solve for aggregate TFP, which equals to
TFP =
 
1
M
 1
 1
PM
i=1

Ai(1 Y i)
(1+Ki)
w1 i
 1  1
"
MX
i=1
1 Y i
wi
h
Ai(1 Y i)
(1+Ki)w
1 
i
i 1#1  " MX
i=1
1 Y i
1+Ki
h
Ai(1 Y i)
(1+Ki)w
1 
i
i 1#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8 Appendix III. Variance decomposition
For rm i; in quintile q; we can write
QX
q
NqX
i
 
tqi   t
2
=
QX
q
NqX
i

(tqi   tq) +
 
tq   t
2
=
QX
q
NqX
i
(tqi   tq)2 +
QX
q
NqX
i
 
tq   t
2
+2
QX
q
NqX
i
(tqi   tq)
 
tq   t

(126)
where Nq is the number of rms in quintile group q, Q is the number of quintile group.
Here we dene tq as the average t within quintile group q, and t is the total average
among all t (across quintiles):
tq ,
1
Nq
NqX
i
tqi (127)
t , 1
N
NX
i
tqi (128)
where
N =
QX
q
Nq
For the last term of (126) with out parameter, we nd that
QX
q
NqX
i
(tqi   tq)
 
tq   t

=
QX
q
NqX
i

tqi
 
tq   t
  tq  tq   t
=
QX
q
NqX
i
tqi
 
tq   t
  QX
q
NqX
i
tq
 
tq   t

=
QX
q
" 
tq   t
 NqX
i
tqi
!#
 
QX
q
Nqtq
 
tq   t

=
QX
q
 
tq   t
 NqX
i
tqi  Nqtq
!
(129)
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Insert (128) into (129), and get
QX
q
NqX
i
(tqi   tq)
 
tq   t

= 0
Then we rewrite
QX
q
NqP
i
 
tqi   t
2
as
QX
q
NqX
i
 
tqi   t
2
=
QX
q
NqX
i
(tqi   tq)2 +
QX
q
Nq
 
tq   t
2
=
QX
q
Nq
NqX
i
(tqi   tq)2
Nq
+
QX
q
Nq
 
tq   t
2
=
QX
q
NqV arq(tqi) +
QX
q
Nq
 
tq   t
2
dividing both side by N, the total number of rms (N =
QX
q
Nq )
1
N
QX
q
NqX
i
 
tqi   t
2
| {z }
over-all variation
=
1
N
QX
q
NqV arq| {z }
within group component
+
1
N
QX
q
Nq
 
tq   t
2
| {z }
between group component
V ar(ti) =
QX
q
Nq
N
V arq(tqi) +
QX
q
Nq
N
 
tq   t
2
(130)
Thus take the TFPR as an example. TFPR is grouped into productivity quintiles, then
(130) becomes
var(lnTFPRi) =
1
5
QX
q
NqX
i
 
lnTFPRqi   lnTFPR
2
| {z }
over all variation
=
QX
q
1
5
var(lnTFPR)q| {z }
within group component
+
QX
q
1
5
 
lnTFPRq   lnTFPR
2
| {z }
between group component
where lnTFPR is the overall mean of TFPRi. var(lnTFPR)q is the variance of lnTFPR
in each quintile q. lnTFPRq is the mean of lnTFPR in quintile q.
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